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COMMENTARIES
JOHN MARSHALL IN SPENCER ROANE'S
VIRGINIA: THE SOUTHERN
CONSTITUTIONAL OPPOSITION TO THE
MARSHALL COURT
F.

THORNTON MILLER*

Between 1819 and 1821, with cases such as McCulloch v.
Maryland' and Cohens v. Virginia,' John Marshall delivered his
most nationalist opinions. Marshall was not, however, advancing
an interpretation of the Constitution in a country generally
receptive to his views. Nor, in any positive sense, were his court
opinions just part of the Era of Good Feelings, the patriotic and
nationalistic popular mood that swept through America after the
War of 1812. Rather, Marshall was on the defensive. His opinions
were being criticized. The authority of the Supreme Court was
being questioned. Marshall and his good friend, Joseph Story,
were very disturbed by the opposition coming from Virginia. The
opposition was led by state judges, in particular, by Spencer
Roane, senior judge of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Marshall and Story knew how serious a states' rights movement
led by Virginia could be. They saw it as Anti-Federalism revived.
Indeed, Roane had been an Anti-Federalist. Did the states' rights
persuasion want to reverse the decision of 1788? Again, as in the
1780s, the question was: would America be a nation or a league of
sovereign states?
Marshall, believing the thread that held America together,
the federal supreme law of the land, was being threatened,
assumed its defense, in court opinions and out of court essays. He
and his chief judicial adversary of the states' rights school, Roane,
presented their opposing constitutional views in court case
opinions such as, for Roane, Hunter v. Martin,Devisee of Fairfax,3
and, for Marshall, Cohens v. Virginia.4 They both went beyond the
courts and carried their debate into the newspapers. Marshall's
' Associate Professor of History, Southwest Missouri State
University.
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essays were written as "A Friend of the Constitution" and Roane's
essays were written as "Hampden" and "Algernon Sidney."5
Other Virginians joined Roane. While the Virginia judiciary
ignored'Supreme Court decisions, the Virginia state legislature
passed resolutions supporting its judiciary and opposing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the states; for
example, John Taylor wrote Construction Construed and
Constitutions Vindicated attacking the nationalists. The still
popular Thomas Jefferson publicly supported Taylor, Roane, and
Virginia's stand against the Supreme Court. Far from Virginia
being isolated, other states were concerned about the Marshall
Court's nationalist opinions, and, in Congress, some discussion
emerged regarding repealing Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, which authorized the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
over state courts.
Despite all of Marshall's efforts, a states' rights movement
had begun; it developed through the 1820s, and was dominant by
the Jacksonian era. Many Marshall Court opinions were ignored
at that time. Marshall and Story were concerned that their
nationalist opinions would not be precedents for future law.
Marshall was in a struggle.
Only much later could it be
determined whether he was on the winning side.
Several questions need to be considered. One is in terms of
timing: why did the Southern or Virginia states' rights opposition
start when it did? Another concerns motivation: why did such a
condemnation of the Supreme Court emerge?
First, in the debate that emerged between Marshall and
Roane, both sides were on the defensive. The states' rights
reaction to the Marshall Court needs to be kept in the context of
the Era of Good Feelings. Second, the Fairfax litigation through
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee6 was important in terms of both the
timing and motivation for Roane's and states' rights Virginians'
opposition to the Marshall Court. Third, the Fairfax litigation
made the problems with the appellate process in Section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 apparent to the states' rights persuasion.
First, the Marshall Court's nationalist opinions were viewed
by the states' rights group as being part of the Era of Good
Feelings. Roane and other Virginians who shared what can be
called the agrarian or country republican perspective found most
aspects of the era disturbing-the Marshall Court opinions were
joined with the nationalistic mood, the talk of banks, and a
national system of roads and canals. The states' rights movement
5. For information on Roane, "Hampden" and "Algernon Sidney," and for
more information on Virginia's opposition to the Marshall Court, and on the
Fairfax litigation, see F. THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VERSUS THE
LAW: VIRGINIA'S PROVINCIAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783-1828, chs. 5-7 (1994).

6. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

20001

John Marshall in Spencer Roane's Virginia

1133

rose to counter this trend in America.
Leaders such as Roane were afraid that prosperous times,
after the War of 1812, would lull their fellow Virginians into
complacency. During this Era of Good Feelings, William Branch
Giles stated that a malignant star had shone above the United
States. He called on Virginians to maintain their political virtues
and principles and to resist the exchange of all that was good,
stable, valuable, and venerable for mere novelty. The Panic of
1819 was viewed as confirming the warnings on experimenting in
banking. Virginians had to face serious economic problems and
would have to find others to blame for their decline. Starting with
their reaction to the events and rhetoric of the Era of Good
Feelings, including the Marshall Court's nationalist opinions, the
states' rights leaders believed they were on the defensive.
Second, in terms of the Marshall-Roane dispute, and
specifically the challenges to the judiciary, emphasis needs to be
placed on the Fairfax litigation that led to Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee.7 This is important for understanding when and why the
Virginia states' rights opposition arose. It also is a necessary
background for understanding Roane's motivation for his
antagonism with Marshall.
Marshall and Roane had been in opposite political camps in
Virginia.
Roane, the son-in-law of Virginia's leading AntiFederalist, Patrick Henry, became one of the leaders of the state's
Republican party. By 1801, Marshall was clearly Virginia's most
prominent Federalist. It was perhaps not mutual for the two
judges, but, for Roane, the antagonism with Marshall could be
personal. Roane disliked and distrusted Marshall. This can be
seen through their involvement in the Fairfax litigation.8
This litigation involved land that had been part of Lord
Fairfax's proprietary domain in the Northern Neck, about a third
of settled Virginia. It involved two sets of land disputes: land
confiscated during the Revolution and the same land which was
7. Id.
8. For Roane's attacks, see Marshall v. Conrad, 9 Va. 364 (1805); Hunter
v. Fairfax's Devisee, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218 (1809).

On problems for the

Marshalls, see Letter from Henry St. George Tucker to St. George Tucker
(Dec. 3, 1805), TUCKER-COLEMAN PAPERS (on file with College of William and
Mary); Letter from John Marshall to James Marshall (Apr. 1, 1804), in 6 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 277-79; Letter from John Marshall to James
Marshall (Feb. 13, 1806), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 426-27;

Letter from John Marshall to James Marshall (Nov. 21, 1808), in 7 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 185-87.

For discussion of the continued

litigation by the Marshalls, see Petition for Writ of Error, Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 121-22; and 3 VIRGINIA
COURT OF APPEALS, ORDER BOOKS 183 (on file with the Virginia State
Archives); 4 VIRGINIA COURT OF APPEALS, ORDER BOOKS 326, 5 VIRGINIA
COURT OF APPEALS, ORDER BOOKS 75, 427, 437; and 6 VIRGINIA COURT OF
APPEALS, ORDER BOOKS 258.
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then sold by the state, setting off a land boom. One of the
purchasers was David Hunter, a land speculator, who was an
active litigant trying to secure his title-and, after the Revolution,
land that was the object of escheat proceedings by the state (a
process reverting property to the state where no one is entitled to
inherit) which the British Fairfax family hoped to sell. John and
James Marshall headed a syndicate, which included Henry Lee,
that was interested in purchasing it. The Marshalls, who were the
American attorneys for Denny Martin Fairfax and the British
Fairfax family, handled litigation involving both sets of land
disputes: on the one hand, challenging the sale of the confiscated
Fairfax land, and, on the other hand, defending the claim of the
Fairfax family to the land being escheated which the Marshall
syndicate wished to purchase.
John Marshall, while a member of the Virginia General
Assembly, managed to work through a compromise act, known as
the Compromise of 1796, wherein the Fairfax family deeded to the
state the confiscated land, which cleared the titles to all the
Fairfax land the state had sold-including the land purchased by
David Hunter. The state ceased the escheat actions against the
remaining Fairfax land, which allowed the Marshall syndicate to
acquire some of the choicest land in northern Virginia, and the
Fairfax family to gain 20,000 pounds sterling.
Not all questions, however, were settled by the Compromise of
1796.
The main issue, which was not mentioned in the
compromise, was rents: the status of unpaid back rents and all
other various rents, including quit rents, that had once been
collected by the lord proprietor of Virginia's Northern Neck. The
Marshalls tried to gain these rents and found themselves in
continuous litigation. They had problems in Virginia courts,
including criticism from Judge Roane. They had grave concerns as
litigants in courts which appeared, increasingly, to be hostile to
their interests. To secure rents (and given that the Compromise of
1796 legislation could be repealed, reopening the escheat
proceedings), it would be best for the Marshalls to rest their claim
not on the compromise, but on the proprietor's title secured by the
Treaty of 1783 and the Constitution. As Roane saw it, the
Marshalls needed a suit that would get around the compromise
because any new case would come after the passage of that
legislation. Roane believed that this was the only reason for the
continuation of the Fairfax litigation after the compromise,
specifically, the continuation of Hunter v. Fairfax'sDevisee.' This
litigation was initiated before the Compromise of 1796, but, after
the compromise, had not been struck from the docket of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. The suit was continued

9. 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218 (1809).
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through hearings, decisions, and appeals to Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,'0 not by David Hunter, who had no interests involved after
1806 when he sold the land that was the subject of the
controversy, or by the state, because, after the compromise
legislation, the status of the confiscated land was no longer in
dispute, but by the Marshalls.
In his opinion in the state court cases, Judge Roane attacked
Marshall. Roane reminded Virginians that Marshall had assured
them in the state ratifying convention that Fairfax would not be
able to reestablish his proprietary domain or collect his feudal
rents. Now it was Marshall himself trying to collect them. Would
he try to reestablish the feudal domain as well?
In Hunter v. Fairfax'sDevisee," the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia ruled against the Marshalls and entered the
Compromise of 1796 upon the record, and, from the bench, Roane
In the
attacked Marshall for trying to trick Virginians."
Compromise Act, Roane said, the Fairfax-Marshall side had
agreed to give up one half of the old proprietary domain-the
claim to what had been confiscated-to get the other half, what
the Marshall syndicate was buying. However, now the Marshalls
sought to throw out the compromise agreement to gain the whole.
Roane presented in his opinion the old Anti-Federalist view of
the Fairfax controversy, that Virginia had preferred a general
confiscation of British property to the common law procedure of
escheating individual tracts of land, and that such a general
confiscation was within the power of a sovereign state. The Treaty
of 1783, enacted after the ratification of the Constitution, through
the Supremacy Clause, did not affect this confiscation because the
treaty only barred future confiscations. Indeed, Roane believed
that the Compromise of 1796 had been unnecessary, that the
escheat proceedings should not have been stopped, that all of the
former Fairfax land should have been taken by the state.
The Marshalls appealed to the Supreme Court which ruled in
their favor in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee." Due to his
personal involvement, Marshall did not participate officially.
Joseph Story gave the opinion of the Court.' In his opinion, Story
ignored the Compromise of 1796, part of the record of the appeal
from the Court of Appeals, and went beyond the record to include
the Jay Treaty. Also, he made a pronouncement on Virginia law
which did not involve a construction of the Constitution, treaty, or
federal law. He ruled that Virginia's highest court erred on the
common law. He determined that Virginia should have gone
10. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
11. 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218 (1809).

12. Id.
13. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
14. Id.
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through common law escheat proceedings, therefore improperly
confiscating the land. He ruled that the state could not legally
confiscate the land after the Treaty of 1783, and could not legally
escheat any of it under the Jay Treaty. Story included the Jay
Treaty because it confirmed the articles in the 1783 treaty that
protected British claimants from actions taken against them owing
to their alien status, and it applied to any kind of escheat action,
unlike the Treaty of 1783, which, it could be argued, was restricted
to unlawful confiscations. Marshall finally received a solid judicial
basis for his claims to land and rents under federal treaties.
Further, the Court awarded to the Fairfax-Marshall side both the
land that the Marshall syndicate was buying and the land
confiscated by the state.
Roane saw this as ample proof that the Anti-Federalists had
been correct. Had a Revolution been fought so that years later,
through treaties and the Constitution, the Supreme Court could
reestablish a feudal domain in republican Virginia? Was it to be
headed by Lord Marshall? Roane was inclined to get into disputes.
In his mind this one with Marshall was clearly between opposite
This antagonism was personal, political, legal and
forces.
constitutional, and ideological as well. Roane was ready to lead
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia to actively defy the
Marshall Court.
When the decision was sent down in Fairfax's Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee," the Virginia high court refused to comply. In
Hunter v. Martin, Devisee of Fairfax,6 the Supreme Court of
The
Appeals decided, instead, to review the subject again.
Virginia judges contended that Story violated the Judiciary Act of
1789 by discarding the Compromise of 1796 legislation from the
record of the appeal. His opinion was also incorrect in that the
treaty that related to the issues in the 1780s and early 1790s was
not the Jay Treaty, but the Treaty of 1783. (Marshall, in the later
Fairfax litigation, after Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 realized that
Story's use of the Jay Treaty had been a mistake).'8
The Supreme Court of Appeals maintained that a good
amount of the litigation concerned only state law and did not
relate to U. S. law, treaties, or the Constitution. The Virginia
court denied both that a valid federal jurisdiction could be
established regarding the case, and Story's claim that a federal
court could decide upon state common law.' 9

15.
16.
17.
18.

11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1814).
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
Letter from John Marshall to James Marshall (July 9, 1822), in 9 THE

PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, at 239-41 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1998).
19. 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1814); for more on Story, on federal jurisdiction over
state law, and, for the discussion below, on the Judiciary Act of 1789, see F.
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The Virginia Court also had the problem of how to comply
with the Supreme Court's ruling. Was it to return land to Fairfax
that had been deeded by him to the state? (Regardless of the
Supreme Court's decision, the Compromise of 1796 legislative act
had been agreed to by all parties, it had not been reviewed and
declared unconstitutional, and it was still in effect.) The Virginia
judges took the decision and Story's opinion as little more than a
challenge, refused to comply with the Court's ruling, and, indeed,
denied the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state
courts.
The Virginia state legislature passed resolutions
supporting its judiciary.
Hunter v. Martin, Devisee of Fairfax" was appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Marshalls hoped that the Court would
continue to ignore the Compromise of 1796, on the grounds that
the compromise legislation came after the original suit was begun,
counter to the position taken by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia. Story agreed. Again, this was a question of state law
having no relation to U.S. statute, treaty, or the Constitution.
Story, again, gave the opinion of the Court-in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee.21 As before, Virginia ignored the Marshall Court.22
One should not underestimate the importance of these cases
leading up to Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.22 To Roane and other
states' rights Virginians, already in opposition to the Supreme
Court over the Fairfax litigation, later opinions, such as
24
McCulloch v. Maryland,
added oil to the fire.
Finally, there is another reason for the states' rights
opposition, and another aspect of the Marshall-Roane dispute, that
should be explored. This involves the controversy around Section
25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Again, for Virginians such as
Roane, this problem was brought out in the Fairfax litigation-the
cases before the Supreme Court were Section 25 appeals.
Section 25 had, of course, been in effect with the Judiciary Act
since it was passed by Congress in 1789. Anti-Federalists and
others with states' rights concerns were not initially critical of the
Judiciary Act, or, specifically, Section 25. Oliver Ellsworth and
the First Congress tried to be conciliatory in developing the federal
judicial system. They tried to satisfy Anti-Federalist concerns,
especially the demand that justice be kept close to home. In the

THORNTON MILLER, Joseph Story's Uniform, Rational Law, in GREAT
JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 49-72 (William D. Pederson & Norman
W. Provizer eds., 1993).
20. 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1814).
21. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
22. Fragment of Argument, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, in 8 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL, at 122-26 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1995).
23. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
24. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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federal court system, each state was made a district for district
and circuit courts, and, within each district, that states' rules
applying to common law trials would be used when in accordance
with the Constitution and federal law. Also, district judges had to
reside in their districts. Questions of fact were to be tried by a
jury, and appeals would be on the record as it stood from the lower
court. (The circuit courts consisted of the federal judge of the
district in which the court was held and two Supreme Court
Justices, who literally rode the circuit through their different
districts, and an appellate procedure was established leading to
the Supreme Court.) Anti-Federalists were pleased with local
juries being guaranteed in the Judiciary Act (and in the Bill of
Rights). A ruling on a question of law by the Supreme Court could
be tempered in practice by the actions of a jury in a lower court as
it determined the facts. Further, the Judiciary Act not only
established a decentralized federal judicial system with courts in
each state, it also drew upon the services of the state courts. This
would allow a concurrent jurisdiction by state courts on federal
and constitutional questions. This was one of the reasons why
nationalists, indeed, became critical of the Judiciary Act.
Justice Story was one of the critics of the Judiciary Act of
1789. He believed the act constrained the federal judiciary. "No
court of the United States has any general delegation of authority
'in all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or to be made,
under its authority'." Even federal government officials often had
to move through the state courts to enforce federal law. Is it not
incredible, he asked, "that the United States will submit all their
own rights, and those of their officers to the decisions of State
tribunals?"
He felt this violated the dignity of the federal
Story believed that because the Judiciary Act
government.
allowed state courts to have jurisdiction over areas that touched
upon the Constitution or federal law-despite the recourse of
appeal into the federal courts-state courts, as the Anti-Federalist
and states' rights persuasion hoped, could check the federal courts.
It infuriated Story when litigants had to seek through state courts
matters of a general concern and coming under the Constitution or
federal law. 5
While nationalists such as Story would have their problems
with the Judiciary Act, it seemed to be generally acceptable to
those of the Anti-Federalist or states' rights perspective through to
the Era of Good Feelings. What finally alerted and alarmed Roane
and other states' rights Virginians was the possible threat to state
law and state courts from Section 25 appeals. This problem was

25. A Bill Further to Extend the Judicial System of the United States, in 1
LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, at 293-95 (William W. Story ed., 1851).

2000]

John Marshallin Spencer Roane's Virginia

1139

brought out in the Fairfax litigation.
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed appeals from
state courts to the Supreme Court on questions regarding the
Constitution, treaty, and federal law. Yet, as noted earlier, Story,
in his opinion in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 6 made a
pronouncement on state law declaring that Virginia erred in how,
during the Revolution, it seized Fairfax land. After the Supreme
Court sent down its decision to be carried out, Roane and the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Hunter v. Martin,
27
Devisee of Fairfax,
reviewed the subject again, criticized Story's
opinion, and refused to carry out the Supreme Court decision. 8
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia dealt with one of
the specific problems posed by Section 25 appeals: once a case was
appealed on federal or constitutional questions, what was to stop
the U.S. Supreme Court from ruling on matters in the case that
were not directly related to the federal or constitutional questions?
The Supreme Court of Appeals, as the highest state court, made a
final decision on state law, in a common law suit, in Hunter v.
Fairfax's Devisee.29 Would the court accept a reversal of that
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court through an appeal-Fairfax's
Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee 3 -brought under Section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789? In Hunter v. Martin, Devisee of Fairfax,"
the Virginia court dealt with the question of whether this
appellate procedure was proper, or, in other words, the court
engaged in the judicial review of Section 25 of the Judiciary Act
The major problem the Virginia Court found with Section 25
was the interconnection of the federal and state governments in a
way that violated divided sovereignty and went against the spirit
of the Constitution. The court concluded that the two systems of
government should be kept separate.
If a party in a suit
considered the Constitution, treaty, or federal statute to be
involved, then this federal question should be placed before the
federal judiciary at the commencement of the litigation. There
should be no appeal from the state's highest court to the Supreme
Court. Such an appellate power meant that, even in suits
determined by state common law, the Supreme Court could send
reversals back through the state courts to be carried out. The U.S.
Supreme Court could potentially become the final or supreme
court for the law of each state.
After reviewing Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia declared it unconstitutional.
26. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
27. 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1814).

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218 (1809).
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1814).
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Neither the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear Fairfax'sDevisee
v. Hunter's Lessee was recognized nor its reversal of the decision
in Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee33 . Furthermore, as already noted,
the Virginia judiciary would ignore Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.34
Reflecting upon the nationalist and states' rights debate of
the nineteenth century, while it was always difficult to mark out
the distinct spheres of the federal and state governments, this
appeared to be an even greater problem with the judiciary. It was
easier to distinguish between the constitutional powers of
Congress and state legislatures or the President and state
governors than between federal and state courts. The connection
of the federal and state courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789
exacerbated the problem. What disturbed Roane and others in the
states' rights group was that the very interconnectedness of the
federal and state courts in Section 25 would allow the federal
judiciary to impose its jurisdiction over state law.
Roane and other states' rights jurists believed that Section 25
appeals posed a real threat to the states, specifically a threat to
the institutional independence and integrity of the state courts. It
appears Roane was sincerely afraid that the state courts would be
reduced to a status similar to county courts within a state. He was
afraid that the barriers would be broken down, there would be just
one American law, all courts would be courts of this American law,
and appeals would run to the Supreme Court which would lay
down the law for all courts to follow.
It should be noted that to deny Section 25 appeals would
allow each state supreme court to be the final court in that state
on the U.S. Constitution.
This is obviously important in
understanding Marshall's and Story's motivation in defending
Section 25. However, in understanding the motivation of Roane
and the states' rights side, Section 25 appeals also allowed the
Supreme Court to act as the final court of appeals for a state on
state common law.
Roane had his fears. Marshall did as well. Marshall saw a
real threat to the Supreme Court and the Constitution from Roane
and the states' rights movement. That motivated him to write his'
nationalist court opinions and his out of court essays. Placed in
historical context, both sides were struggling with each other,
hoping that their vision of America would prevail.

32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
33. 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218 (1809).
34. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

